1979 revolution and Iran Iraq war

The Iranian revolution was an earth shaking event, it was a true social revolution comparable with the Russian and Chinese revolution, except for the fact that it did not cost much bloodshed among the ordinary Iranian people. Yet, that bloodshed will eventually come not in the form of internal conflict but of external war, a war that dragged on for 8 years while delivering no benefit for any party of the conflict. This was the Iran Iraq war. It is safe to say that the Iran Iraq war would not have happened had the 1979 revolution not taken place.

The Iranian revolution of 1979 shook the geopolitical dynamic of the middle east forever. It transformed Iran from a steadfast absolute secular monarchy into a islamic theocracy and a republic. This transformation collapsed the western alliance system in the middle east, but the country that feared Iran’s revolution the most is its ancient neighbour: Iraq. Iraq at the time was under the secular dictatorship of Saddam Houssein, leader of the Baath Arab nationalist movement in Iraq. The Baath took power in a coup that overthrew the pro US monarchy and established a secular and nationalist dictatorship with one party(Baath party) being in the supreme position. This political system worked when its immediate neighbour, Iran, was also a secular regime with an extensive control of its Shia extremist faction. Yet, all of that changed when Iran turned from a state suppressing to a state encouraging the general Shia revolutionary movement around the middle east. Iraq is a religious country, and despite what the Baath party claims, the base of its regime is still the Sunni minority in the country. Therefore, a secular dictatorship with Sunni characteristics presiding over a majority Shia country has the perfect ingredient for instability which was exactly what Saddam feared after the Iranian revolution. Saddam regime’s inherent weakness makes it easily the first and the most vulnerable target if the new Iranian regime seeked to export its revolution since the Shia majority, long suppressed by the Saddam government, was a source of revolt which can be exploited by Iran. As Saddam was questioned by the allies upon his capture about the Iran Iraq war, he responded with ““to have Iran not interfere in our internal affairs” Thus proving the fear of Saddam about the prospect of a spillover of the Iranian revolution supported by the new Iranian government. The primary reason for Iraq to invade was its defensive response to the rise of political Islam across the region represented to Iran. Saddam’s Sunni based secular regime is ripe for a Iran style revolution and a leadership figure was already in place. Grand Ayatollah Muhammad al-Sadr, a highly respected and politically active cleric whom Khomeini was familiar with from his 13 years of exile was highly popular among the marginalized minority of Iraqi Shia, and this resentment from Iraq’s Shia majority, in Saddam’s point of view, is going to trigger a civil war if Iraq had not used its military superiority and force Iran to back down.

Saddam’s character is one of cruel and opportunistic. Thus, there is also the factor of Saddam’s opportunistic approach to foreign policy which contributed to his invasion of Iran. Saddam believed firmly that Iran’s military was in disarray and that Iran’s new regime is prone to instability, and that a victory over Iran will crown him as the leader of the international Arab movement. Long standing territorial dispute between Iran and Iraq resulted in the 1975 border agreement that saw Iraq concede many claimed territory, and a bitter Saddam saw an opportunity to take back these Iraqi territorial claims through force as Iran was in a woeful internal position. Saddam saw a chance to gain control of both sides of the Persian gulf and the Iranian Khuzestan province, greatly strengthening Iraq’s position in the Middle Eastern political arena. Saddam’s opportunistic calculation of a superior Iraqi military crushing Iran, stabilizing the home front, and capturing the disputed Arab region of Iran was what pushed Iraq into a protracted war with Iran. But by the end of the war, the Iranian regime benefited from Saddam’s invasion.

The sudden invasion of Iran initially struck the country’s chaotic army in disarray and there was a massive collapse across the front. But as the Iranian population was still in a mood of revolutionary enthusiasm, the Iraqi invasion galvanized the Iranians, resulting in an unprecedented outpour of patriotism. The people rallied behind the new government, making the march of the Iraqis stall. The Iranian propaganda machine quickly seized on the opportunity and a great number of public sponsored posters, artwork, and patriotic symbols excited the participation of the Iranian people. The Shia sense of martyrdom played a major role in the conflict as it encouraged many Iranians to use their life as a shield against the superior weaponry of the Iraqis, resulting in disproportionate deaths from the Iranian side. The Iranian government strengthened its domestic standing by pushing a narrative of the Iranian people in solidarity and engaging in a Jihad against the invading Iraqis. The war framed a new united front among the Iranians as the whole country was on a total war footing. Much to Iraq’s shock and dismay, Iran's people (including Iranian Arabs) rallied in support of the country and put up a stiff resistance. Saddam’s attempt at crushing Iran and forcing it to back down on major domestic and border issues had instead strengthened the Iranian regime and rallied the Iranian people behind the new theocracy the Iraqis were trying to destroy.